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Introduction: Although the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA) is one of the most
frequently reported areas of activation in functional imaging studies, the role of this brain
region in cognition is still a matter of intense debate. Here we present a patient with a focal
lesion of caudal pre-SMA who displays a selective deficit in updating a response plan to
switch actions, but shows no impairment when required to withhold a response e
stopping.
Materials & methods: The patient and a control group underwent three tasks designed to
measure different aspects of cognitive control and executive function.
Results: The pre-SMA patient displayed no impairment when responding in the face of
distracting stimuli (Eriksen flanker paradigm), or when required to halt an on-going
response (STOP task). However, a specific deficit was observed when she was required to
rapidly switch between response plans (CHANGE task).
Conclusions: These findings suggest that the caudal pre-SMA may have a particularly
important role in a network of brain regions required for rapidly updating and imple-
menting response plans. The lack of any significant impairment on other measures of
cognitive control suggests that this is not likely due to a global deficit in cognitive control.
We discuss the implications of these results in the context of current theories of pre-SMA
function.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).1. Introduction
The pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA) in humans is
located in the dorsomedial frontal cortex, rostral to the sup-
plementary motor area (SMA) and dorsal to the cingulate
motor areas (Nachev, Kennard, & Husain, 2008). Although thek (R.E. Roberts).
Elsevier Ltd. This is an opepre-SMA is the most frequently activated brain region in
neuroimaging studies (Behrens, Fox, Laird, & Smith, 2012),
there is still no consensus on its function. In terms of its
connectivity with other brain regions, pre-SMA displays a
profile that is quite distinct to neighbouring SMA,withmore of
its connections projecting to dorsolateral prefrontal cortexn access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.
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humans (Johansen-Berg et al., 2004; Kim et al., 2010) and an-
imal studies (for a review see Nachev et al., 2008).
Despite the wealth of information from neuroimaging,
decoding the precise role of pre-SMA remains to be estab-
lished and has proven to be challenging, due to its apparent
involvement in situations which could imply many different
functions (Nachev et al., 2008). In humans the principal focus
of a large number of studies has been to identify the contri-
bution of pre-SMA to the performance of tasks designed to
measure aspects of cognitive control and executive function
(Curtis & D'Esposito, 2003; Nachev, Rees, Parton, Kennard, &
Husain, 2005; Shima & Tanji, 2000). These paradigms often
require participants to rapidly inhibit or alter a pre-potent
response (Curtis & D'Esposito, 2003; Logan & Cowan, 1984;
Mostofsky et al., 2003; Nachev et al., 2005), or to respond
accurately in the presence of distractors (Botvinick, Nystrom,
Fissell, Carter, & Cohen, 1999; Luks, Simpson, Dale, & Hough,
2007; Shima & Tanji, 2000). To date, evidence from func-
tional imaging has implicated pre-SMA in stopping an on-
going response (Aron & Poldrack, 2006; Obeso, Robles,
Marron, & Redolar-Ripoll, 2013; Picard & Strick, 1996; Sharp
et al., 2010), selecting between conflicting response alterna-
tives (Forstmann, van den Wildenberg, & Ridderinkhof, 2008;
Garavan, Ross, Kaufman, & Stein, 2003; Mostofsky &
Simmonds, 2008; Nachev et al., 2005; Van Gaal, Scholte,
Lamme, Fahrenfort, & Ridderinkhof, 2011), and switching
from automatic to voluntary action (Curtis & D'Esposito, 2003;
Isoda & Hikosaka, 2007; Nachev, Wydell, O'Neill, Husain, &
Kennard, 2007; Ullsperger & von Cramon, 2001).
Diffusion tensor imaging in humans has also been used to
describe a triangular structural network linking pre-SMA,
inferior frontal cortex (IFC) and subthalamic nucleus (STN)
(Aron, Behrens, Smith, Frank, & Poldrack, 2007), which is also
thought to exist in non-human primates (Nambu, Takada,
Inase, & Tokuno, 1996). It has been proposed that such a
networkmay enable the rapid braking of an initiated action by
providing a ‘hyper-direct’ connection from pre-SMA to STN
(Aron et al., 2007; Nambu et al., 1996). This structural
connection has led to the suggestion that the pre-SMA may
play a key role in stopping on-going responses e possibly
explaining one facet of pre-SMA function. However, even
within the area of cognitive control, it remains unclear pre-
cisely what contribution is made by pre-SMA in situations
with different response requirements.
Some have proposed that pre-SMA may be a key node in
brain networks responsible for the voluntary control of action
(Lau, Rogers, Ramnani, & Passingham, 2004; Rushworth,
Hadland, Paus, & Sipila, 2002), as volition or self-generated ac-
tions (not externally cued) appear to be a common factor across
experimental findings. For example, the Bereitschaftspotential e
a negative premotor potential recorded over central frontal
electrodes in humans e has larger peak amplitudes with self-
initiated actions (Deecke & Kornhuber, 1978); while in mon-
keys, lesions of the pre-SMA impair the ability to initiate arbi-
trary movements to obtain a reward, but the effect is
ameliorated if the animals are cued with an external tone
(Thaler, Chen, Nixon, Stern, & Passingham, 1995).
Unilateral inactivation of monkey pre-SMAwith muscimol
has been found to induce deficits in sequence learning, butperformance of previously well-learnt sequences was left
intact (Nakamura, Sakai,&Hikosaka, 1999). This has led to the
suggestion that this might reflect an impairment of the
mechanism responsible for updating the association between
the correct action given current conditions. Therefore, it is
possible that deficits in self-initiated action observed after
SMA/pre-SMA disruption might arise from a failure to make
the appropriate connection between the action to be initiated
in a novel situation (Nachev et al., 2008).
Trans-cranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) has also been
employed to measure physiological interactions between pre-
SMA and other brain regions associated with response selec-
tion. This has demonstrated that in the presence of response
conflict, pre-SMA facilitates motor-evoked potentials in M1 dur-
ing action reprogramming (Mars et al., 2009), and suppresses
unselectedresponseoptions (Duque,Olivier,&Rushworth,2013).
TMS over pre-SMA has been associated with an increased delay
in the ability to inhibit responses (Cai, George, Verbruggen,
Chambers, & Aron, 2012), but there is also evidence that activity
inpre-SMAcanoccurbeforestopping is initiated,whichwouldbe
indicative of a role in selecting rather than implementing re-
sponses (Swannetal., 2012).However,acaveatof thisapproachis
thatTMSstimulationwhich inducesa transient ‘lesion’mayalso
propagate to other brain networks. Similar effects on network
function have also been observed following anatomical focal le-
sions, dependent on the position of the brain area within the
network architecture and degree of white matter involvement
(Gratton, Nomura, Perez, & D'Esposito, 2012).
Although cognitive control, self-initiated action and
sequence learning may not be mutually exclusive functions,
providing an overarching framework which can account for the
range of such complex behaviour has provendifficult. Due to the
extremely rare incidence of focal damage to this brain area in
humans, only a very small number of lesion studies of pre-SMA
have been reported. Moreover, these reports have included pa-
tients whose lesions were not entirely constrained within the
borders of the pre-SMA, extending into sections of either cingu-
late gyrus, superior frontal gyrus or SMA (Floden & Stuss, 2006;
Nachev et al., 2007). As these adjacent brain areas have also
been implicated in cognitive control tasks (particularly anterior
cingulate), it is not possible to entirely disambiguate their
possible contribution to thedeficits observed in these studies. To
ourknowledge therehasbeennoreportofapatientwhose lesion
is entirely constrained within the borders of the pre-SMA.
Here we present a young patient with a highly focal, uni-
lateral lesion of the caudal pre-SMA. Since pre-SMA has
frequently been associated with cognitive control and execu-
tive function, we chose to investigate how this might have
affected performance on three standard tasks, each of which
indexes a different aspect of response selection or inhibition.
The STOP-signal task assesses the ability to inhibit an on-
going response, whereas the CHANGE-signal task requires
the participant to rapidly switch to a different response
plan. Finally the Eriksen flanker task measures how quickly
an individual is able to select between conflicting response
plans that are activated simultaneously. Together these
tasks employ similar stimuli with different rules, to explore
specific aspects of executive function.
Surprisingly we found that she did not display a significant
impairmentwhen asked to stop an action (STOP task), but was
Fig. 1 e Lesion location. A) A high resolution T1-weighted MRI scan of patient KP in native space, the lesion location is
circled in yellow. (B, C, D) The patient's brain image was normalised to standard MNI space and subsections show cross-
sections for sagittal, axial and coronal sections, respectively. In panel B the VCA line is marked as a black vertical line,
posterior to the lesion location. The lesion clearly lies medial to the superior frontal sulcus, anterior to paracentral sulcus,
and dorsal to cingulate sulcus.
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plans (CHANGE task). The patient also displayed no significant
deficit when processing conflict at the level of the stimulus
(Eriksen Flanker). Remarkably, it appears that this lesion of
the caudal pre-SMA impaired the ability to rapidly switch
between overt responses, whilst leaving stopping behaviour
intact. We discuss these findings in the context of the current
literature and the implications for understanding the role of
pre-SMA in voluntary action.2. Materials and methods
2.1. Patient participant
Patient KP is a 28-year-old, right-handed woman who was
diagnosed with epilepsy, following the onset of simple partial
seizures. Following a subsequent grand mal seizure later in
the year, further MRI investigations revealed a very small
Table 1 e Testing protocol for patient KP. A) Neuropsychological test battery for intellectual functioning. B) Focal tests of
cognitive function. C) Testing protocol for the experiments described in this chapter. KP was tested on the CHANGE, STOP
and Flanker tasks over a 10 week period. The numbering 1e3 indicates in which session the data was acquired.
A)
Intellectual functioning 69 days prior 14 days prior 106 days post
Verbal IQ (WAIS-III) 98 Not tested 98
Performance IQ (WAIS-II) 111 Not tested 125
Advanced Progressive Matrices Not tested 41st %ile 56th %ile
Memory
Recognition Memory Test Words 50th %ile 25e50th %ile 50th %ile
Recognition Memory Test Faces At chance 50e75th %ile 90th %ile
Doors and People e People Test Not tested 50th %ile 50e75th %ile
Doors and People e Shapes Test Not tested 75 %ile 75th %ile
B)
Focal cognitive Prior Post
Naming Skills 50e75th %ile 95th %ile
VOSP Silhouettes and Cube Analysis >5% cut off >5% cut off
Stroop colour-word Very superior Very superior
Trails B 90th %ile 75e90 %ile
Symbol Digit Modalities Test average mild impaired
C)
Days post-surgery 31 71 104
Session 1 2 3
Task
CHANGE task X X X
STOP task X
Eriksen Flanker X X
c o r t e x 6 3 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1 8 4e1 9 5 187cavernoma (a blood vessel anomaly, also sometimes referred
to as a cavernous haemangioma). This was located on the
medial aspect of the right superior frontal gyrus. At the time,
KP was experiencing complex partial seizures with secondary
generalisations, and the cavernoma was subsequently
resected.
A follow-up structural scan 4 months after surgery
demonstrates the focal nature of the lesion, which lies
medial to the superior frontal sulcus and rostral to the
paracentral sulcus. The paracentral sulcus has previously
been demonstrated to be a useful landmark for the location
of the supplementary eye field (SEF) (Grosbras, Lobel, Van de
Moortele, LeBihan, & Berthoz, 1999), which lies at the caudal
border of the pre-SMA; thus this lesion lies well within the
pre-SMA. The sagittal sections in Fig. 1A and B illustrate that
the lesion is clearly located dorsal to the cingulate sulcus
(and cingulate motor areas). Importantly, therefore, any
behavioural deficit observed in this patient cannot be
attributed to direct damage to ACC or SMA as the bound-
aries of the lesion do not encroach on the surrounding brain
areas.2.2. Control participants
A group of 10 healthy volunteers (7 males) were recruited to
act as a control group, mean age ¼ 30.9, SE ¼ .63). All partici-
pants were right-handed (mean score ¼ 90, SE ¼ 2.6); Edin-
burgh Handedness test (Oldfield, 1971). All reported normal or
corrected-to-normal colour-vision and no subject was taking
any medication. Participants were reimbursed £8/h to cover
travel expenses.2.3. Assessment
2.3.1. Clinical neuropsychological evaluation
A clinical neuropsychological assessment of KP was con-
ducted before and after surgery (Table 1). The assessment
included measures of intellectual function (Verbal IQ, Perfor-
mance IQ), memory (recognition memory test for words and
faces) and focal cognitive abilities (Naming skills, VOSP sil-
houettes and Cube Analysis, Stroop colour-word, Trails B,
Symbol Digit Modalities test).2.4. Experimental tasks
2.4.1. Behavioural tasks
2.4.1.1. STOP TASK. In the STOP task (Fig. 2A) participants are
instructed to respond as quickly as possible to the direction of
an imperative GO stimulus. In this version of the task, which is
a variant of a CHANGE task we have presented previously
(Roberts, Anderson,&Husain, 2010), the GO signal was a green
arrow pointing left or right, and participants were required to
press either a left or right response key using the corre-
sponding index finger (Logan, Cowan, & Davis, 1984). On 50%
of trials the GO signal was the only stimulus presented. On the
remaining trials the GO signal would be followed, after a
variable delay, by a STOP signal: a vertical red bar. In the event
of a STOP signal, participants were instructed to attempt to
withhold their response. They were also instructed to avoid
waiting for a STOP signal.
Throughout the course of the experiment the stimulus
onset asynchrony between the GO and STOP signals was
varied parametrically using a staircase algorithm in response
Fig. 2 e Design of behavioural paradigms. A) The CHANGE of plan task. Participants must respond to the direction of the
green Go arrow unless they see the red CHANGE arrow, whereupon they must change their response. B) The STOP-signal
task. Participants must respond to the direction of the green Go arrow unless they see the STOP bar, when they must
withhold their response. C) Eriksen flanker task. Participants must respond to direction of the central arrow whilst ignoring
the peripheral distractors.
c o r t e x 6 3 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1 8 4e1 9 5188to the performance of the participant (Levitt, 1971). This was
in order to determine the delay at which each participant was
able to correctly respond to a STOP signal on 50% of trials; the
STOP-signal reaction time (SSRT). In order to account for drift
in reaction times, a cubic spline was fitted to the CHANGE-
signal reaction time (CSRT) data, guided by the shape of Go
responses. This method uses the local variation of the Godistribution to interpolate across STOP trial data points. The
resulting distribution provides an approximation of the local
Go RT for each Stop trial, which is then used to calculate the
SSRT.
2.4.1.2. CHANGE TASK. The CHANGE task (Fig. 2B) employed a
similar design to the STOP task. However, instead of a STOP
Fig. 3 e Behavioural findings. Main findings from
behaviour experiments. A) STOP task. KP demonstrated no
significant difference in performance on this task
compared to the control group. B) CHANGE task. KP
demonstrated significantly increased latency when
required to change responses (CSRT) in all three testing
sessions.
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red arrow pointing in the opposite direction to the GO signal
(Roberts et al., 2010). Participants were instructed to respond
as quickly as possible to the GO signal, unless they saw a
CHANGE signal, in which case they had to attempt to respond
with the finger corresponding to the direction of the CHANGE
signal instead. The delay between the GO and CHANGE signals
was varied in the same manner as described in the STOP task
in order to find delay at which each individual was able to
change their response on 50% of trials; the CSRT.
2.4.1.3. ERIKSEN FLANKER TASK. In this version of the flanker task
(Roberts et al., 2010) participants were asked to respond to the
direction of a central target arrow using their index fingers.
The target arrow could point either left or right, and presented
above and below it were distracting objects (Fig. 2C). These
could be either arrows pointing in the same direction as the
target (congruent), the opposite direction (incongruent) orsquares (neutral). Participants were instructed to respond as
quickly and as accurately as possible to the central target
arrow, and ignore the distractors. Performance on this task is
measured in terms of latency of response to all three stimulus
types.
In addition, performance is also measured by comparing
the relative differences in reaction time between the three
conditions, thus providing three additional indices of.
 Pure Cost (incongruent-neutral RT)
 Benefit (neutral-congruent RT) and
 Incongruence Cost (incongruent-congruent RT).
These measures are often used to estimate the level of
positive (facilitating) and negative (interference) effects on
reaction time evoked by flankers, with higher incongruence
costs usually regarded as indicative of poorer cognitive control
on this task. Intra-individual coefficient of variation (ICV) is
calculated by dividing the variance in reaction times to neutral
stimuli by the mean response (Stuss, Murphy, Binns, &
Alexander, 2003). This provides an estimate of the consis-
tency of an individual's responses, and patients with frontal
lesions have previously demonstrated impairments on this
metric (Stuss et al., 2003).
2.5. Procedure
All participants were tested in a quiet room with neutral
lighting conditions. For the purposes of this experiment, KP
was tested on three occasions starting 4 weeks after surgery;
see Table 1 for testing protocol. The first session was held 30
days after surgery. The legend of Fig. 3 denotes the session at
which the testing took place, labelled S1eS3 (respectively, 4,
10 and 15 weeks post-surgery). Each task took around 30 min
to complete, but it was not possible to test KP on CHANGE,
STOP and Flanker tasks on all three occasions due to time
constraints.
2.6. Data analysis
In order to determine whether there was a significant differ-
ence between the behaviour of the patient and the control
group, confidence limits were employed as described by
Crawford and Garthwaite (Crawford & Garthwaite, 2002;
Crawford, Garthwaite, & Porter, 2010). This method has
become widely used to compare a single case with healthy
individuals (Couto et al., 2012). All comparisons are made
using a one-tailed level of significance (p < .05) because there
were explicit predictions about the pattern of results based on
the previous neuroimaging literature discussed in the Intro-
duction. The figures presented are shownwith ± one standard
deviation.3. Results
3.1. Clinical and neuropsychological results
KP did not demonstrate any decrements in intellectual func-
tion or memory following surgery for her right-hemisphere
c o r t e x 6 3 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1 8 4e1 9 5190cavernoma, when tested 15 weeks after surgery (see Table 1).
There were no significant changes in focal cognitive ability,
except a very mild decline in her performance on the Symbol
Digit Modalities Test, on which she was considered borderline
impaired, whereas she had previously been average.
3.2. Experimental task results
3.2.1. STOP task
KP was tested once on the STOP task, on the second occasion
we saw her (Table 1). The SSRT provides an estimate of the
time required for an individual to correctly inhibit an initial
response on 50% of trials. On this task KP's SSRT (150 msec)
was not significantly different (t ¼ .78; p > .22) to the control
group (mean ¼ 177 msec, SD ¼ 32.1; Fig. 3A).
KP's leftward SSRT was longer than rightwards (12 msec),
but this deviation was not significantly different to the con-
trols (t¼ .29; p > .39) who also showed slightly greater leftward
slowing (7.3 msec, SD ¼ 15.4). In terms of GO reaction time, KP
(532 msec) was not significantly different to the control group
(mean ¼ 434, SD ¼ 114.3; t ¼ .82). She demonstrated virtually
no lateralisation in GO reaction time, being only 2 msec
quicker when making leftward responses. This was not
significantly different to the control group (t ¼ .14; p > .45),
who overall were slightly slower when making leftward re-
sponses (5 msec, SD ¼ 20.9). Thus, KP's performance on the
STOP task was entirely within normal limits when assessed
(Session 2, S2).
3.2.2. CHANGE task
KPwas tested three times on the CHANGE task over the course
of 10 weeks (see Table 1). Performance on this paradigmuses a
similar metric to the STOP-signal paradigm, however here the
CHANGE-signal reaction time (CSRT) reflects the time taken to
inhibit an initial response and then correctly execute a second
response on 50% of trials.
In the first session (S1), four weeks after surgery, KP's CSRT
(382 msec) was significantly higher (t ¼ 2.85; p < .01) than the
control group (mean¼ 268msec, SD¼ 37.7), see Fig. 3B. KP also
demonstrated a highly significant lateralisation in CSRT
(t ¼ 2.6; p < .005; paired-samples t-test), with leftward CSRT
46 msec slower than rightward. This lateralisation was
significantly different to the control group (t ¼ 2.61; p < .028),
who demonstrated a leftward slowing of only 6 msec
(SD ¼ 4.6). Both leftward and rightward CSRT measurements
were still highly significantly different to the controls (t¼ 3.05;
p < .007).
Importantly, in terms of GO reaction time KP
(mean ¼ 435 msec) was not significantly slower than the
control group (mean ¼ 395 msec, SD ¼ 160.1; t ¼ .24). She did
demonstrate an increased latency in responding to leftward
GO signals (11 msec), but this was also not significantly
different to the controls (t ¼ .17) who showed a similar lat-
eralisation (mean ¼ 14.9 msec, SD ¼ 21.9).
In the second testing session (S2), 10 weeks after surgery,
KP's CSRT had reduced to 329 msec. Despite this improve-
ment, KPwas still significantly impaired relative to the control
group (t ¼ 2.2; p < .028). In this session KP's GO reaction time
had increased (581msec), but this was not significantly higher
than the controls (t ¼ .82, p > .43). Nor was the lateralisation inher responses significantly different to the controls in this
session in terms of Go responses (t ¼ 1.04) or CSRT (t ¼ .83).
In the third session (S3), 15 weeks after surgery, KP's CSRT
(324 msec) had reduced by a small amount relative to session
S1. However, she still remained significantly impaired relative
to the controls (t ¼ 2.038; p < .036). KP's GO reaction time
improved in this session (382 msec), and was again not
significantly different to the controls (t ¼ .077), neither was
her lateralisation in responding in terms of Go reaction time
(t ¼ .913) or CSRT (t ¼ .738).
Thus, KP demonstrated a consistent impairment on the
CHANGE task in all three testing sessions, and a lateralised
leftward slowing in CSRT in the first session. Note that on the
session where we were able to test her on both the STOP and
the CHANGE tasks, she performed normally on the former but
was impaired on the latter (compare Fig. 3A and B).
3.2.3. Eriksen flanker task
KP's performance on the Eriksen flanker task was assessed in
two separate sessions (S2 and S3). In session S2 there were
significant differences in reaction time between KP and the
controls, but to all three stimulus types. Her reaction time
when responding to congruent stimuli (468 msec) was signifi-
cantly longer (t ¼ 2.38; p < .021) than the control group
(mean ¼ 383.7 msec, SD ¼ 34.1). Similarly when responding to
neutral stimuli (502 msec vs controls mean ¼ 408 msec,
SD ¼ 34.4; t ¼ 2.56; p < .016). The most significant difference
between KP's reaction time (570 msec) and the control group
was in response to incongruent stimuli where there was a
112 msec increase in latency relative to the control group
(458 msec, SD ¼ 35.0; t ¼ 3.14; p < .001). Thus, in session S2, KP
showed overall slowing across all conditions.
In terms of lateralisation of response, KP demonstrated
significant leftward slowing compared to rightward responses
(t ¼ 2.1; p < .02; paired-samples t-test) on congruent and
neutral trials; but no significant difference in response to
incongruent stimuli. However, these differences between
leftward and rightward movements were not significantly
different to the control group on congruent (KP ¼ 20.4 msec;
Controls ¼ 10 msec, SD ¼ 18.0), incongruent (KP ¼ 3.2 msec;
Controls 16 msec, SD ¼ 19.3), or neutral stimuli
(KP ¼ 24.5 msec; Controls ¼ 21 msec, SD ¼ 15.5).
We also calculated the relative differences in reaction time
between the stimuli to assess whether KP was more suscep-
tible to interference effects than the controls. KP's reaction
time Benefit (34 msec) was not significantly different (t ¼ 1.57)
to the control group (mean ¼ 24.9 msec, SD ¼ 6.6). However,
her Pure Cost (68 msec) was significantly higher (t ¼ 3.97;
p < .001) than the controls (mean ¼ 49.8 msec, SD ¼ 4.06). In
addition, there was also a significant difference between the
Incongruence Cost measures where KP (102 msec) demon-
strated a 27 msec increased latency compared to the control
group (mean ¼ 75 msec, SD ¼ 8.08; t ¼ 3.35; p < .001). KP's
accuracy in responding (97%) was not significantly different to
the control group (mean ¼ 94.2%, SD ¼ 5; t ¼ .56). We also
calculated KP's ICV (4.49), but this was again not significantly
different to the controls (mean ¼ 3.98, SD ¼ .89; t ¼ .539).
It is possible that the large increase in incongruence costs
demonstrated by KP in session 2 could have been a product of
generalised slowing, rather than a specific impairment when
Fig. 4 e Lesion location with respect to previous functional imaging studies. The location of functional activations in pre-
SMA from six previous studies which employed cognitive control tasks are superimposed on the structural image of the
lesion location in MNI space to illustrate the proximity of the lesion to previous functional imaging results. The studies
include STOP-signal (Aron & Poldrack, 2006; Sharp et al., 2010), Go-NoGo (Garavan et al., 2003; Mostofsky et al., 2003) or
designs where the response plan had to be rapidly updated or changed (Nachev et al., 2005; Rushworth et al., 2002). All the
studies have >100 citations and were chosen for illustrative purposes rather than as a comprehensive meta-analysis. The
axial and sagittal coordinates were used in order to demonstrate the rostro-caudal extend of the lesion with respect to
previous findings.
c o r t e x 6 3 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1 8 4e1 9 5 191responding to incongruent stimuli. To investigate this possi-
bility, the ratio between neutral reaction time and the three
incongruence measures was examined. If KP were to
demonstrate a significant deviation from the controls on these
measures, this might be evidence that her incongruence costs
were not just a product of increased reaction times. The
analysis demonstrated that the ratio of neutral reaction time
to Incongruence Cost (KP ¼ .21; Controls ¼ .18, SE ¼ .022), Pure
Cost (KP ¼ .14; Controls ¼ .12, SE ¼ .014) or Benefit (KP ¼ .068;
Controls ¼ .059, SE ¼ .015) there was no significant difference
between KP and the control group. Therefore it is likely that
KP's higher incongruence costs in the first sessionwere simply
a consequence of a general increased latency in responding
following her lesion.
In the following session (S3) KP's reaction times improved
and there was now no significant difference between her re-
action time to congruent (422 msec), incongruent (495 msec)
or neutral stimuli (440 msec), compared to the control group.
Nor were there any significant differences between any of the
incongruence measures and the controls. In this session KP
again demonstrated no significant differences in accuracy
(94%) to the control group, and her consistency (ICV) in
responding to neutral stimuli increased relative to the previ-
ous session (4.91), but was not significantly higher than in the
control group (mean ¼ 3.98, SD ¼ .89; t ¼ .99).
In summary, in the first session using the flanker task (S2),
KP was consistently slower in responding to all three types of
stimuli. KP also demonstrated significantly larger incongru-
ence costs, but this is likely a product of generalised slowing.
In the second Flanker session (S3), KP demonstrated no sig-
nificant impairment compared to controls.4. Discussion
In this study we explored the behavioural consequences of a
lesion of the caudal right pre-SMA on three standardmeasures of cognitive control. Our aim was to identify
whether KP's behaviour had changed as a result of the lesion
and how this could be integrated into contemporary accounts
of pre-SMA function. To our knowledge the lesion described
here is unique in the literature as it does not extend into
neighbouring anterior cingulate cortex or SMA.
We employed tasks designed to index specific aspects of
executive function or cognitive control in order to stratify the
behavioural effects of the lesion. We explored whether re-
sponses that require inhibition of pre-potent response (STOP
task), updating of a response plan (CHANGE task), or inhibition
of distractors (Eriksen flanker) were affected when perfor-
mance was compared to a control group. We found that KP
demonstrated a specific deficit when rapidly updating a
response plan as assessed by the CHANGE task. However, no
significant deficits were observed when KP was required to
withhold a response on the STOP task or during situations
where conflict occurred at the level of the stimulus, as in the
Eriksen flanker task (except generalised slowing).
The location of the lesion with respect to medial frontal
activations from several previous experiments which were
designed to isolate brain responses associated with either
stopping or changing a response plan is shown in Fig. 4A and
B. There is clearly a high degree of overlap with activation foci
from tasks requiring either stopping or changing a response
plan, yet in this patient we only observed a deficit in action
updating. This illustrates the challenge for interpretation of
these behavioural findings. We now attempt to place this
finding in the context of current theories of medial frontal
cortical function.
One approach to explaining the relationship between brain
function and cognitive control is to examine the complexity of
the response required for a given task. Classifying paradigms
with respect to their complexity potentially provides a single
metric to distinguish different tasks (Nachev et al., 2008), and
offers a way to interpret the range of behaviour which has
been associated with the pre-SMA (Behrens et al., 2012). For
c o r t e x 6 3 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1 8 4e1 9 5192example, performance on the STOP task requires an on-going
response to be inhibited, whereas the CHANGE taskmight first
require inhibition of the prepared response and then execution
of the alternate response. As the CHANGE task is computa-
tionally more complex than the STOP task, these tasks might
recruit different brain areas.
It has been suggested that such differences in functional
complexity could be encoded along a rostro-caudal gradient
within the supplementary motor complex (SMC), an area
which includes both pre-SMA and SMA (Nachev et al., 2008). In
this model, more rostral areas are associated with a higher
degree of conflict processing or complexity of response than
caudal regions. What evidence is there that such a gradient
exists in SMC?
Neuroimaging and lesion evidence in humans, and
neurophysiology in monkeys suggests that increasingly
complex tasks are more often associated with rostral SMC
areas (Matsuzaka & Tanji, 1996; Nachev et al., 2005; Picard &
Strick, 1996; Picard & Strick, 2001), with caudal regions more
strongly associated with action execution, but it remains un-
clear the degree of functional granularity it is possible to
detect within this region. In terms of brain structure, pre-SMA
and SMA are separable based on their patterns of structural
connectivity in both humans and monkeys (Inase, Tokuno,
Nambu, Akazawa, & Takada, 1999; Johansen-Berg et al.,
2004). Furthermore, in humans, pre-SMA has been parcellated
into anterior and posterior regions based on differences in
functional connectivity (Zhang, Ide, & Chiang-shan, 2012). As
the resolution of these techniques improves, further sub-
divisions may also be detectable.
In the context of the lesion described here, the complexity
model predicts that stopping responses could be initiated by
structures other than pre-SMA. One possible candidate is
adjacent, caudally located SMA, where stimulation or lesions
have been found to affect the ability to inhibit actions (Drewe,
1975; Fried et al., 1991; Picton et al., 2007), and which has also
been associated with automatic, unconscious inhibition of
voluntary actions (Sumner et al., 2007). Therefore it might be
possible that pre-SMA is not specifically required for stopping,
and instead plays amore important role in switching response
plans.
A challenge to this interpretation comes from recent work
where pre-SMA activity was modulated using TMS during
performance of a response inhibition task. The authors re-
ported that implementation of the stopping process was dis-
rupted without affecting the ability to update response plans
(Cai et al., 2012; Obeso et al., 2013). Macrostimulation of pre-
SMA in humans has also been found to halt motor re-
sponses (Filevich, Ku¨hn, & Haggard, 2012; Swann et al., 2012).
Although these studies suggest that pre-SMA is directly
involved in stopping responses, the use of SMA as a control
site could have extended their findings, and the possibility of
non-localised effects of the stimulation modalities cannot be
entirely discounted, particularly since SMA is directly adja-
cent to pre-SMA. However, if stimulation of pre-SMA can
inhibit a response but a lesion of the caudal pre-SMA does not
affect stopping, how can these apparently inconsistent posi-
tions be reconciled?
One approach is to consider whether inhibitory control of
behaviour might not be governed by a unitary system. Inhumans, although the Go-NoGo and STOP-signal paradigms
have often been grouped collectively under the term ‘response
inhibition’, they are actually associated with quantitatively
different patterns of activation (Swick, Ashley, & Turken,
2011) e suggesting that ‘not going’ and ‘stopping’ are not
necessarily synonymous. Recently it has been proposed that
inhibiting a responsemight be achieved in two different ways:
reactive and proactive (Aron, 2011). Reactive inhibition is con-
ceptualised as a global stopping mechanism analogous to the
handbrake in a car, whereas proactive inhibition is a selective
system deployed when stopping is anticipated, more like a
footbrake.
The neuroanatomical evidence for the existence of sepa-
rate response inhibition pathways comes from monkey
neurophysiology studies. Here pre-SMA and SMA have been
found to maintain separate projections with two subcortical
regions that have frequently been associated with response
inhibition: the STN and striatum (Inase et al., 1999). The
frontosubthalamic and frontostriatal pathways are thought to
mediate ‘hyperdirect/reactive’ and ‘indirect/proactive’ modes
of inhibition respectively. Evidence from intracellular re-
cordings suggests that the convergence of these pathways in
the basal ganglia may explain their complementary func-
tionality.When STN and globus pallidus neurons are activated
in response to cortical or corticofugal stimulation, they are
subsequently inhibited via activation of the slower frontos-
triatal projection (Smith, Beyan, Shink, & Bolam, 1998).
Although the microcircuitry of the basal ganglia is highly
complex and still not fully understood, this feedback mecha-
nism might facilitate the process of halting an action in order
to then initiate an alternative response, and provides a
possible explanation for the existence of separate cortico-
subcortical inhibitory pathways.
In humans, changes in motor-evoked potentials (MEPs)
recorded during performance of response inhibition tasks
have been used to explore how differences in task re-
quirements can affect the rest of the motor system. In a
simple STOP-signal task that required only a left or right
thumb press in response to the direction of a go signal, sup-
pression of motor activity in successful STOP trials was
observed bilaterally in both hand and leg muscles up to
400 msec after the stimulus was presented (Badry et al., 2009).
Thus this result appears to exemplify global inhibition. In a
separate experiment where participants were cued as to
which hand movement they were likely to have to inhibit,
preparatory suppression was observed more specifically,
occurring only in the cued effector muscles (Claffey, Sheldon,
Stinear, Verbruggen, & Aron, 2010). These findings suggest
that inhibition can be applied globally or in a selective fashion
depending on the behavioural context. They may therefore
reflect the difference between deployment of reactive vs.
proactive inhibition.
If there are differentmechanisms for inhibition, how could
this explain the findings reported here in our patient?
Consider a situation where reactive inhibition is initiated by
SMA and proactive inhibition by pre-SMA. First, following a
lesion of the pre-SMA region mediating proactive inhibition,
performance of the STOP task would remain intact if reactive
stopping were mediated by SMA. Paradoxically, response
times might even improve, as it would minimize involvement
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Second, in a situation where there is a selective deficit in
proactive inhibition, performance of the CHANGE task would
now have to rely on the reactive inhibitory mechanisms. Thus
instead of being able to selectively halt a pre-potent response
and update it, the reactive global stopping response would
have to be deployed.
Deploying such a mechanismmight be possible but comes
at a cost. STN stimulation in Parkinson's disease ewhich may
affect the hyperdirect/reactive pathway e improves perfor-
mance on STOP and Go-NoGo tasks (Van den Wildenberg
et al., 2006), but also results in cortical inhibition-related ac-
tivity which persists for up to 400 msec (Baker, Montgomery,
Rezai, Burgess, & Lu¨ders, 2002). Suppression of motor output
over a similar timescale due to global inhibition has also been
observed using MEPs (Badry et al., 2009). These data suggest
that although the CHANGE task could be performed using the
reactive inhibitory pathway, this would come at the cost of a
delay due to the duration of the post-stimulus suppression.
Thus, caudal pre-SMA may not be necessary for stopping per
se, but might be more important for selectively inhibiting an
action plan in order to switch to an alternative response. This
possibility is supported by evidence from studies of neurons in
monkey pre-SMA and functional imaging in humans which
suggest that pre-SMA may be crucial for switching between
controlled and automatic behaviour (Forstmann et al., 2008;
Isoda & Hikosaka, 2007). Thus, it is likely that this patient
might also exhibit elongated reaction times on tasks which
specifically test the ability to switch between response plans.
Unfortunately, we did not have the opportunity to test this.
As there is evidence to suggest that focal lesions can also
result in disruption of network activity (Gratton et al., 2012),
and since pre-SMA is thought to form a part of a right-
lateralised inhibitory network (Aron et al., 2007), to what
extent can it be reasonably argued that these findings are
attributable to deficits solely in pre-SMA function? First, the
lesion is a consequence of a resection, rather than vascular
pathology, and is highly constrained within the grey matter,
therefore it is unlikely that the observed behaviour is the
result of a pure disconnection syndrome. Second, this distinct
deficit in switching between responses is consistent with
previous electrophysiological recordings in monkey pre-SMA
(Isoda & Hikosaka, 2007, 2008), whereas the function of the
other regions involved in this inhibitory network, IFC and STN,
has been more consistently associated with either stopping
responses or attentional capture (Aron& Poldrack, 2006; Sharp
et al., 2010; Swann et al., 2012), behaviours in which we
observed no deficit at all. However, future studies may still
wish to consider employing functional or structural neuro-
imaging e such as DTI or resting state e in order to test for
possible differences in network function following such
lesions.
The lateralisation of the lesion to the right hemisphere
raises the question of whether a patient presenting with a left
hemisphere lesion would demonstrate a similar deficit. The
extant evidence places right pre-SMA as a node in a right-
hemisphere network involved in response inhibition (Aron
et al., 2007), but to our knowledge no similar network has
been identified in the left hemisphere. A recent meta-analysis
suggests that right pre-SMA is more strongly activated inresponse to increased task difficulty e situations which are
very likely to involve an element of selection or response
switching (Keuken et al., 2014). Therefore it appears that there
is evidence to suggest that left and right pre-SMA may
perform different functions, but how much these reflect
hemispheric specialisations and differences in task design
remains an open question.
This discussion has focused on the role of pre-SMA and
SMA in stopping and switching response plans. Other regions
within medial frontal cortex, particularly ACC, have also been
implicated in stopping responses (Botvinick et al., 1999).
Lesion studies have demonstrated functional heterogeneity
within ACC, with the behavioural deficits dependent on the
modality of response (Turken & Swick, 1999), and more often
associated with deficits in error detection and correction
(Ullsperger & von Cramon, 2006). The Eriksen Flanker differs
fundamentally from the STOP and CHANGE paradigms
because it activates conflicting responses simultaneously,
analogous to the Stroop effect, rather than via two separate
stimuli presented at different temporal intervals. This may
explain why we did not observe any significant behavioural
deficits on this paradigm, except generalised slowing. These
data might arguably be considered to be consistent with the
proposal that ACC does not activate when only stimulus se-
lection is required, but instead appears to provide an evalua-
tive and error monitoring function in situations of conflict
(Rushworth, Walton, Kennerley, & Bannerman, 2004; Swick &
Turken, 2002).
In conclusion, our finding of a dissociation between stop-
ping and switching actions following a lesion of caudal pre-
SMA sheds new light on the role of this brain area in the
control of action. The results suggest that caudal pre-SMA
plays an important role in facilitating selective inhibition,
either by promoting this directly or by initiating transitions
between reactive and proactive inhibitory mechanisms.
Future investigationsmight profitably consider the distinction
between reactive and proactive mechanisms when devel-
oping tasks to probe the fundamental function of pre-SMA.Acknowledgements
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